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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: COOPER v. AARON 
AND PARENTS INVOLVED 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III* 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooper v. Aaron1 is a notable decision for many reasons.  It presents 
dramatic facts and occupies an important place in the history of the struggle for 
racial equality.2  But its role in the constitutional canon is largely as an 
exemplar of judicial supremacy.3  Cooper announced that “the federal judiciary 
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution” and further that an 
“interpretation of [the Constitution] enunciated by th[e] Court . . . is the 
supreme law of the land.”4 
The consequence of judicial supremacy is generally taken to be that, as 
Matthew Adler puts it, “a Supreme Court ruling on constitutional matters binds 
the world, not just the parties to the case.”5  When the Supreme Court 
announces the meaning of the Constitution, that is, everyone else must accept 
its word.  But what precisely that means—how far the obligation of acceptance 
extends—depends on how much of a Supreme Court decision consists of 
announcing constitutional meaning. 
This is a question that has received relatively little attention in the 
literature on judicial supremacy.  To the extent that scholars distinguish among 
the different elements of a judicial decision, they tend to focus on the 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank David Strauss for an 
insightful and enlightening lecture, the organizers of the Childress Symposium for their efforts 
and hospitality, and my fellow panelists for their excellent contributions. 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. For a stirring retelling of the tale of Cooper, see David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the 
Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. ____ (2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (“The Pure Judicial Supremacy Model endorses all of the claims of 
judicial power asserted by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron.”); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 221 (2004). 
 4. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 5. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 760 (2006). 
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difference between the judgment and the opinion.6  With respect to the 
opinion, as Richard Fallon puts it, “[s]ince Marbury v. Madison . . . we have 
tended to equate judicial pronouncements with constitutional meaning.”7  
However, as Fallon goes on to note, “this is a position that cannot be 
sustained.”8  This Article will start with a closer examination of the structure of 
constitutional decision-making, which separates it into three distinct stages.  It 
will then proceed to assess the arguments for and against judicial supremacy at 
each of these stages, and to consider what form resistance to judicial decisions 
might take and how successful such resistance might be.  Last, the Article will 
use this model to describe the relationship between Cooper v. Aaron and other 
decisions dealing with racial discrimination, both older cases, such as Plessy v. 
Ferguson9 and Brown v. Board of Education,10 and more recent ones, such as 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena11 and Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1.12 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION 
The conventional view of constitutional decision-making is captured in a 
famous statement by Justice Owen Roberts: The Court’s task in a 
constitutional case is “to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked 
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares 
with the former.”13  On this view, constitutional decision-making is a 
straightforward one-step process.  The Court simply determines whether a 
governmental act is consistent with the Constitution. 
But how is that determination made?  Roberts’s suggestion cannot, of 
course, be taken literally—laying an article of the Constitution beside a statute 
achieves nothing in any but the most trivial case.14  The next thought—that the 
Court interprets the Constitution and compares the statute to that 
 
 6. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1539, 1541–42 (2005) (distinguishing between judgment and opinion). 
 7. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 39 (2001). 
 8. Id.  Somewhat surprisingly, Fallon’s recent discussion of the executive obligation to 
obey judicial judgments does not explore the implications of this insight in that context.  See 
Fallon, supra note 3. 
 9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 11. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 12. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 13. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). 
 14. Laying Article II, Section 1, next to a statute providing that the President need only have 
attained the age of thirty years might suffice to establish unconstitutionality.  But laying down the 
Equal Protection Clause will not take a court very far, while laying down an “ink blot” such as 
the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause may make things worse.  See 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 
(1990). 
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interpretation—might seem plausible until one actually reads a Supreme Court 
opinion.  Consider actual Supreme Court practice and it will quickly become 
clear that the Court very seldom tests statutes against either the plain text of the 
Constitution or some interpretation of that text.  Instead, statutes are tested by 
tests—the notorious multi-pronged, multi-factor judicial creations that 
implement the meaning of the Constitution.15 
What this means is that constitutional decision-making is not a one-step 
process (compare the statute to the Constitution) or even a two-step one 
(interpret the Constitution and compare the statute to the interpretation).  A 
more accurate picture describes a three-step process.16  First, the Court must 
decide what the Constitution means.  It might decide, for instance, that the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is that states may not discriminate in 
ways that stigmatize or contribute to the existence of a caste system.  How it 
reaches this account of meaning is not my concern right now, nor is the 
accuracy of the interpretation relevant to the argument.  The structure of 
constitutional decision-making I describe here neither requires nor prohibits a 
particular method of constitutional interpretation; nor does it depend on views 
as to the meaning of particular provisions. 
Second, the Court must create a doctrinal test to implement this meaning.  
It might decide, for instance, that discrimination against racial minorities will 
survive review only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest, while discrimination against people with disabilities will survive if 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.  Again, how it decides 
that a particular doctrinal test is appropriate is not my present concern—it 
might consider how trustworthy other governmental actors are, or what history 
 
 15. For a taxonomy of constitutional tests, as well as an explanation of the distinction 
between meaning and doctrine, see FALLON, supra note 7. 
 16. The view that constitutional decision-making has the structure I describe is a 
consequence of the basic insight that there is a difference between doctrine—the tests that courts 
apply to determine whether rights have been violated or powers exceeded—and meaning.  The 
insight can be traced back virtually as far as American legal scholarship.  See, e.g., James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 144 (1893).  Some decades ago, the idea regained prominence in articles by Paul Brest and 
Larry Sager.  See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional 
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  More recently, 
Richard Fallon and Mitchell Berman have worked to develop and apply the insight.  See, e.g., 
FALLON, supra note 7; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 
(2004).  I have pursued similar targets in KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2006) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT, 
ACTIVISM]; Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the 
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Calcification]; and Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
983 (2006). 
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shows about the use of certain kinds of discrimination, or various other 
factors.17  But somehow, it arrives at a doctrinal test.  Last, it applies this test to 
a particular set of facts—it decides, for instance, whether a particular act of 
racial discrimination is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. 
One might quibble with this description, perhaps on the grounds that 
Supreme Court decisions tend not to feature an explicit three-step analysis.18  
Certainly it is true that in many cases the Court will not consider meaning at all 
but simply apply tests established by prior decisions.  But in such cases the 
initial task of creating doctrine has already been performed and is implicitly 
endorsed—or at least accepted on stare decisis grounds—by the current Court.  
In cases when the Court is creating a new test, it frequently either goes through 
a relatively explicit three-step analysis or at least acknowledges the distinction 
between doctrine and meaning.19 
Still, refining the taxonomy of constitutional law is worthwhile only if it 
bears fruit in insight.  The claim of this Article is that the distinction between 
doctrine and meaning will give us a more nuanced understanding of what is at 
stake in debates about judicial supremacy.  In particular, once we have divided 
constitutional adjudication into the three steps described above, we see that it is 
possible to accept or reject a claim for judicial supremacy at each one.  The 
claim will have different degrees of persuasiveness at the different steps.  It 
will also have different consequences, in that actors outside the federal 
judiciary will face different constraints and have different methods of 
responding available.  Last, we can gain a deeper understanding of cases by 
considering the stage at which they assert claims of judicial supremacy. 
 
 17. For an exposition of some relevant factors, see Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 16, 
at 1658–67. 
 18. The most notable critique is probably Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).  As I have explained elsewhere, 
Levinson’s article actually reads better as a contribution to the literature developing this model 
than a critique of it—that is, it provides a cogent argument that the consequences of awarding 
particular remedies are a factor that goes into the construction of doctrinal rules, but no reason to 
think that the distinction between doctrine and meaning is either theoretically incoherent or 
lacking in utility.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 193, 194–96 (2006). 
 19. A recent example of such decisions is Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), which 
self-consciously considers the importance of manageable standards in the creation of doctrine.  
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (discussing Vieth).  Others include the plurality 
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985), which discuss when heightened scrutiny is appropriate 
in equal protection cases, and even United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938), whose famous footnote four gives an explanation of when doctrinal tests should be non-
deferential. 
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II.  STAGES OF SUPREMACY 
This Part will examine the arguments for judicial supremacy at each stage 
of the process I have described.  The question of judicial supremacy, put 
generally, is whether the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on 
constitutional questions.  I will be asking more particularly whether it ought to 
be considered the ultimate authority at each of the three stages. 
It is worth first explaining what is at stake in a claim to judicial supremacy, 
or what it means to be the ultimate authority.20  One can consider this issue 
from two perspectives—that of a non-Article III actor and that of the Court.  I 
will be focusing on the latter, and the basic question I ask is how the Court 
should treat the views of non-Article III actors—with deference, neutrally, or 
with suspicion. 
A conclusion in favor of judicial supremacy from the judicial perspective 
does not determine the duties of non-Article III actors.  In particular, it does 
not suggest that Supreme Court decisions should be above criticism, nor that 
non-Article III actors must express agreement or refrain from trying to 
persuade the Court, through appointments or arguments in the course of 
litigation, to change its mind.  The Court can make mistakes.  It is not even to 
say that non-Article III actors must obey the Court, for there may be times 
when law-breaking or constitutional violations are appropriate.  It is merely to 
say that when a non-Article III actor has expressed a view contrary to that of 
the Court—as when Congress and the President pass a law the Court deems 
unconstitutional—the Court owes no deference to that view. 
In taking only the judicial perspective, I am, of course, omitting an analysis 
from the perspective of the non-Article III actor.  How such actors should 
understand their duty to the Constitution (their oath, if they are government 
officials) is an interesting question.  But its practical significance may be 
relatively slight compared to that of the judicial perspective.  On the one hand, 
judicial supremacy in anything but its most hypertrophied form does not bar 
non-Article III actors from expressing contrary views and urging them in 
litigation, so acceptance of judicial supremacy will not prevent the Court from 
being faced with the question of how to treat those views.  (And even if it did, 
the Court would confront that question with issues of first impression.) 
On the other, even if judicial supremacy is rejected, virtually no one argues 
that a non-Article III actor can defy a Supreme Court judgment on the grounds 
that her view as to the correct result differs.21  As the assertion of a contrary 
 
 20. For a useful taxonomy of different possible views, see Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. 
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004)). 
 21. Lincoln conceded this in his rejection of Dred Scott.  See generally Abraham Lincoln, 
First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND 
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view will, if litigated,22 end in a judgment, it is again the Court’s assessment of 
what weight to give that view that matters.  Since the Court’s view thus turns 
out to be generally dispositive no matter what the non-Article III actor thinks, I 
believe a focus on the judicial perspective is adequate, even if not 
comprehensive. 
A. Stage One 
The first step of the process I have described requires the Court to 
determine constitutional meaning.  At this step, the argument for judicial 
supremacy is straightforward.  The Constitution is a legal text.  Interpreting 
legal texts is the work of lawyers and judges, and in the ordinary case, the 
decision of a highest court is a definitive statement of the law.  This is the point 
of John Marshall’s memorable definition of the judicial province,23 and it is a 
major theme of later commentators defending judicial supremacy.24 
So phrased, the argument for judicial supremacy is fairly plausible.  Judges 
probably are at least as good as non-Article III actors at interpreting legal texts, 
and quite likely better.  They are also probably just as trustworthy in most 
cases, and more trustworthy in some.  The security of life tenure, professional 
norms urging judges to separate law and politics, the need for reason-giving, 
and the existence of a paper trail of opinions that can expose inconsistency 
provide a combination of independence and constraint that makes judges well 
suited to constitutional interpretation.25 
Indeed, the most notable arguments against judicial supremacy tend not to 
assert that judges are either worse at construing legal texts or systematically 
less worthy of trust.  Instead, they focus on the unique nature of the 
Constitution, arguing that the Constitution’s status as higher law means that 
 
WRITINGS 579 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1969).  On the difference between judgments and opinions, see 
generally Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
123 (1999). 
 22. This is an important qualification, and it may be relevant to the analysis whether the non-
Article III actor is acting in an area where the Constitution seems to preclude judicial review—as, 
for instance, the Senate’s power to try impeachments.  See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
226 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Living With Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579 
(2003).  Because I focus on the judicial perspective, I do not consider this question. 
 23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1997).  For a counterargument based on the 
premise that the Constitution differs from ordinary law, see Larry Kramer’s remarkable book.  
KRAMER, supra note 3. 
 25. This is of course not to say that judges are perfect interpreters, a supposition disproved 
by the amount of disagreement among them.  The question is how they can be expected to 
perform relative to non-Article III actors. 
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non-Article III—and particularly popular—interpretation must be given some 
weight.26 
I sympathize with the popular constitutionalist concern, vividly expressed 
by Abraham Lincoln, that “if the policy of the government . . . is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have 
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their 
government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”27  But I believe that, as 
we shall see, this concern can be largely addressed by moderating claims to 
judicial supremacy at later stages of decision-making, and I see no harm in 
conceding supremacy with respect to pure interpretation. 
Aside from popular constitutionalism, the main academic argument in 
support of judicial deference to non-Article III constitutional interpretation 
focuses on particular provisions of the Constitution, notably Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The grant of enforcement power to Congress, 
scholars have argued, suggests that the Court should defer to the congressional 
interpretations upon which enforcement legislation is based.28 
As with the popular constitutionalists, I will suggest that most of the 
results these scholars seek are consistent with judicial supremacy at the level of 
meaning and deference at a later stage.  But even if we grant that deference is 
warranted, that is an exception that proves the rule—if the Court should defer 
because the Constitution specially indicates Congress as the enforcer, then it 
should not defer in the absence of such indication.29 
If practice is relevant, history does not disclose many examples of non-
Article III resistance at this first stage.  The one most cited is doubtless 
Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to accept the Dred Scott opinion as a binding 
statement of the law,30 though if this were truly based on a vision in which the 
Court was not supreme on constitutional questions it is hard to see why it did 
 
 26. The most recent extended statement of this argument is found in KRAMER, supra note 3, 
at 7–8.  See also, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 21, at 160 (“With a Constitution made in the name of 
‘We the People,’ all of us are legitimately interested in the meaning of the Constitution—all of us 
must be welcome participants in the conversation.”).  Justice Scalia has expressed a contrary 
view.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 1000 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (describing the task of the Supreme Court in 
constitutional cases as the “essentially lawyers’ work” of “ascertaining an objective law”). 
 27. LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 585–86. 
 28. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 
1943, 1947 (2003). 
 29. One might actually make a similar argument that any grant of legislative authority to 
Congress indicates that deference is appropriate.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the commerce power is “expressly assigned to 
[Congress] by the Constitution”).  This argument is less prevalent in the literature. 
 30. LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 585–86. 
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not extend to defiance of the judgment as well.31  Other Presidents—notably 
Franklin Roosevelt and Andrew Jackson—clashed with the Supreme Court, 
but neither asserted that they or anyone else had the power to overrule a 
Supreme Court constitutional decision.32  As for Congress, though the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did unwisely assert that its purpose was to 
“overturn” Employment Division v. Smith,33 it is also intelligible as an attempt 
to assert a contrary view at the second stage.  In any event, once the Court 
struck down the Act, Congress acquiesced.34 
My conclusion is that claims of judicial supremacy are most persuasive at 
this first stage.  The conclusion is a relative one.  It does not require judicial 
exclusivity; it may be desirable for the Court to give respectful consideration to 
the views of non-Article III actors as to constitutional meaning.  And if 
arguments for supremacy become weaker at later stages, those for 
independence remain strong.  I will not end up arguing that the Court should be 
bound by the views of a non-Article III actor at any stage.  But the arguments 
for deference become increasingly plausible at later stages.  That is the point 
this Article seeks to establish and whose implications it seeks to explore. 
B. Stage Two 
At the second stage, the Court constructs doctrinal rules to implement 
constitutional meaning.  Here, the arguments for judicial supremacy seem a 
good deal weaker.  The construction of doctrine is not a task, like interpretation 
of legal texts, that falls squarely within the judicial competence.  Rather, it is a 
process that requires the Court to consider a wide and open-ended array of 
factors.  No listing is likely to be exhaustive, and different factors will assume 
 
 31. For an excellent analysis of Lincoln’s position, see Michelman, supra note 22, at 593–
96. 
 32. Even Jackson’s possibly apocryphal response to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515 (1832), is not an assertion of superior interpretive authority.  For Jackson’s response, see 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
GENERATIONAL REGIMES 49 (2007) (“John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce 
it[.]”).  Indeed, both it and Lincoln’s defense of arguably unconstitutional actions during the Civil 
War seem to concede that the Supreme Court is the highest decision-maker on constitutional 
questions—final, if not infallible.  LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 600 (“[A]re all the laws but one to 
go unexecuted, and the Government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”).  Larry 
Kramer argues against this perspective, suggesting that the Justices should instead “see 
themselves in relation to the public somewhat as lower court judges now see themselves in 
relation to the Court: responsible for interpreting the Constitution according to their best 
judgment, but with an awareness that there is a higher authority out there with power to overturn 
their decisions[.]”  KRAMER, supra note 3, at 253. 
 33. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1902 (“[T]he 
purpose of this act is only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith . . . .”) (discussing 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 34. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
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greater or lesser prominence in different situations, but the Court must, at the 
least, ask how workable a doctrinal rule is in terms of judicial implementation; 
what sort of guidance it provides for non-Article III actors; how easy it is for 
badfaith actors to circumvent; how good a job it does at getting the right 
answers in constitutional cases; how frequently the sort of government action 
under review will be constitutionally sound; and how the costs of different 
sorts of errors (false positives versus false negatives) compare.35  On at least 
some of these issues, non-Article III actors will have greater competence than 
judges. 
Greater competence may not be relevant if the Court decides that there are 
reasons to distrust the non-Article III actor, such as historical evidence of bad 
faith, legislative self-dealing, or a distribution of burdens and benefits favoring 
the politically powerful.  Nor will it be relevant if the constitutional provision 
being implemented is straightforward.  In such cases, the appropriate doctrinal 
rule is relatively obvious.  To ensure that no one under the age of thirty-five is 
elected president, the Court should ask whether it is convinced (most likely by 
a preponderance of the evidence) that a candidate has attained the requisite 
age.  But when the relevant constitutional provision requires implementation 
through a doctrinal rule that varies significantly from the meaning of the 
provision (consider due process, equal protection, or the First Amendment), 
non-Article III actors may well be better than the courts at fashioning doctrine, 
and in some circumstances, deference will be appropriate.36 
History and practice bear out this observation.  The Court has, on occasion, 
given weight to the views of non-Article III actors in constructing doctrine.  In 
Frontiero v. Richardson, for instance, the Court confronted the question of 
what level of scrutiny should apply to sex-based discrimination—that is, what 
doctrinal rule should implement the Constitution’s equality norm37 in a 
 
 35. For a more detailed discussion of some of these factors, see Roosevelt, Calcification, 
supra note 16, at 1658–67.  I have not attempted to rank these factors or prescribe solutions when 
they point in different directions; different rankings and solutions are defensible, and moderate 
consistency is probably the most we can demand of judges. 
 36. This observation is consistent with the views of some critics of judicial supremacy that 
the Court may have the last word when enforcing clear constitutional requirements—such as that 
the President must be thirty-five years old—but that popular sentiments should be heeded in the 
implementation of more open-textured provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause.  This is a 
theme of Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).  To somewhat similar effect, though couched in terms of 
rules and standards, is the analysis set out in Alexander & Solum, supra note 20, at 1633–34. 
 37. 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973).  Frontiero deals with federal discrimination, so the 
relevant provision was the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Distinguishing between state 
and federal discrimination might make good sense, and it was contemplated by the Court with 
respect to race.  See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting greater deference to federal government).  But it does not 
seem to have been considered with respect to sex discrimination, so Frontiero’s analysis applied 
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particular context.  In opting for heightened scrutiny, the plurality gave weight 
to the apparent congressional conclusion that sex-based discrimination is 
inherently invidious.  This sort of result is what the popular constitutionalists 
or proponents of deference to congressional interpretation in enforcing Section 
Five hope for, and thus it is an illustration of how deference at later stages can 
produce much the same thing that some seek by arguing for deference with 
respect to meaning. 
Of course, the Court does not always defer to non-Article III actors in 
crafting doctrine.  If there was one distinctive motif of the Rehnquist Court, it 
was the assertion that such deference is never appropriate—an assertion 
founded, I have argued, on the mistaken equation of meaning with doctrine, of 
the Constitution with what the Court does.38  Thus, in City of Boerne v. 
Flores,39 the Court rejected the congressional suggestion that it restore the 
doctrinal test for Free Exercise claims used in Sherbert v. Verner but discarded 
in Employment Division v. Smith.40  And in Dickerson v. United States, it 
rejected a similar suggestion that it return to the test used to evaluate coerced 
confession claims before Miranda v. Arizona.41 
Even more striking, in Section Five cases like Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett42 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,43 
the Rehnquist Court did more than refuse to change its own doctrine in 
response to evident congressional conclusions that state discrimination on the 
basis of age and disability was highly likely to be invidious.  It actually struck 
down congressional enforcement legislation on the grounds that Congress had 
gone beyond the Court’s doctrine—an approach that makes sense only if the 
distinction between doctrine and meaning is forgotten.44 
Yet even the Rehnquist Court was willing on some occasions to accept the 
suggestions of non-Article III actors.  In Smith v. Robbins,45 the Court accepted 
 
to states as well.  (As blackletter law, Frontiero has of course been superseded by later cases such 
as Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); I use 
it only to illustrate Supreme Court consideration of the views of non-Article III actors in creating 
doctrine.). 
 38. See Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 16, at 1651; see also Larry D. Kramer, 
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001). 
 39. 521 U.S. at 546 (1997). 
 40. How to view Boerne depends in part on whether we think that Smith differed from 
Sherbert in its view of the meaning of free exercise, or whether it simply differed on the question 
of what was an appropriate doctrinal rule.  Smith itself was equivocal on this point, perhaps 
because different Justices held different views.  See Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 16, at 
1685. 
 41. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 42. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 43. 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000). 
 44. See Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 16, at 1710–12. 
 45. 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 
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a procedure that California courts had developed for appointed attorneys to 
follow when declining to file a frivolous appeal as a permissible substitute for 
the procedure it had outlined in Anders v. California.46  Deference at this 
second stage frequently makes sense, and if the Court regains sight of the 
distinction between doctrine and meaning, we can expect more examples in the 
future. 
C. Stage Three 
Last, we have the step of applying the doctrinal test to a particular set of 
facts.  Here, the argument for superior judicial competence reappears.  The 
question is who is better at applying a doctrinal test, and one of the factors 
going into the creation of the test is its workability for judges.  One would 
expect that judges will usually be fairly good at applying tests created with that 
issue in mind. 
Still, if we look at some common tests, it is apparent that in some cases the 
views of non-Article III actors might have substantial value.  The tiers of 
scrutiny, in their different forms, require the Court to assess both the 
significance of particular state interests and the feasibility of alternative 
methods of attaining those interests.  On each of these issues, non-Article III 
actors may have a much better vantage point than the Court. 
The claim is weakest with respect to rational basis review, for the 
standards there (the legitimacy of the interest and the rationality of the means-
end fit) are so capacious that the Court is generally just as good at deciding 
whether a state actor has exceeded them.  In that sense, rational basis review is 
somewhat like the age requirement for the presidency.  The views of non-
Article III actors may have their greatest relevance in rational basis cases when 
society’s view of what is a legitimate interest is shifting.  When it overruled 
Bowers v. Hardwick47 in Lawrence v. Texas,48 the Court was undoubtedly 
reacting to the greater social acceptance of homosexuality, reflected in both the 
general social climate and concrete data such as state court decisions striking 
down sodomy bans on state constitutional grounds.49 
With respect to heightened scrutiny, the argument for superior non-Article 
III competence is easier.  How important an interest is and how feasible it is to 
promote that interest through other means are both questions on which a 
representative legislature or expert administrative body are likely better.  
Heightened scrutiny thus presents a situation in which one factor supporting 
 
 46. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 48. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 49. Id. at 573 (“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the 
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual 
conduct.”). 
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deference—superior institutional competence on the part of a non-Article III 
actor—is present.  However, heightened scrutiny is frequently adopted because 
the Court distrusts the actor whose conduct is being reviewed.50  Thus, 
deference to non-Article III actors in terms of the application of heightened 
scrutiny typically makes sense only in somewhat unusual circumstances.  First, 
if heightened scrutiny is not a reaction to distrust, or if government motive is 
entirely irrelevant, deference and heightened scrutiny may be compatible.  
Second, the Court may defer to a non-Article III actor other than the one whose 
conduct is under review. 
Again, history and practice support this account of occasions for deference.  
I will argue that Grutter v. Bollinger51 is an example of the first of these 
circumstances, where distrust is absent or motive irrelevant.  For the second, 
we might consider congressional authorization of state economic protectionism 
that would otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
III.  COOPER V. AARON AND PARENTS INVOLVED 
The previous Part has suggested that the argument for judicial supremacy 
is strongest at the first stage and weaker at the latter two.  At the second and 
third stages it will be weak indeed in some circumstances, though stronger in 
others.  This Part will investigate where the race discrimination cases make 
their claims, and what that tells us about them. 
A. Early Cases 
To see Cooper and Parents Involved in proper context, we need to go back 
to earlier race discrimination cases, Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of 
Education.  Plessy and Brown are both at least consistent with judicial 
supremacy at the first stage.  They seem to take the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a matter for judicial determination; there is no suggestion 
that some non-Article III actor has influenced the Court’s view.  And in fact, 
they seem to agree on the meaning: Discrimination is forbidden if it is 
stigmatizing or intended to oppress, if it affixes victims “with a badge of 
inferiority.”52  This interpretation emerges very early in the Supreme Court’s 
 
 50. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 438–39 (1997) 
(describing cost-benefit and smoking-out functions of strict scrutiny). 
 51. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896); see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
494 (1954) (“To separate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 
550 (“[E]very exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as 
are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or 
oppression of a particular class.”). 
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interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause—notably in Strauder v. West 
Virginia,53 and it continues unchanged through Plessy and Brown. 
Plessy and Brown are likewise consistent in their creation of a doctrinal 
test: in each case the Court essentially asks “is this discrimination stigmatizing 
or oppressive?”54  In neither case is there evidence that any non-Article III 
actor had input in the creation of that test.  This is not surprising, as the test 
simply attempts to track constitutional meaning, a hallmark of the early stages 
of doctrinal development.55 
Where Plessy and Brown differ, of course, is at the third stage, their 
application of that test to particular facts.  If you think Louisiana’s segregation 
of railroad cars is stigmatic, Plessy says, that’s your problem—it’s only 
because you choose to place that construction on it.56  Brown, by contrast, 
takes a more realistic view of social meaning.  Segregation of schoolchildren, 
Brown says, is stigmatic; it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community . . . .”57  Brown backs this assertion up with a citation to 
social science studies58 that have since been criticized;59 but regardless of the 
soundness of the science, we now agree that Brown was right and Plessy 
wrong on this. 
How the decisions relate in terms of judicial supremacy is harder to say.  It 
is not clear whether the Plessy Court is being deferential to the Louisiana 
legislature or just disingenuous.  It is also hard at this historical remove to say 
how plausible Plessy’s characterization of segregation as a reasonable, good 
faith attempt to promote the public interest was at the time. 
Certainly some people thought that.  On the other hand, Justice Harlan’s 
dissent is fairly damning.  “Every one knows,” Harlan wrote, “that the statute 
in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons 
from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from 
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”60  Its “real meaning” is that 
“colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit 
 
 53. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (striking down law excluding blacks from jury service as 
“practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority”). 
 54. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 55. See Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 16, at 1675–76. 
 56. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (identifying “the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument” as “the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored 
race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 
 57. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 58. Id. at  494 n.11. 
 59. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 60. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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in public coaches occupied by white citizens[.]”61  If the true meaning of 
segregation was so obvious to Harlan, it seems likely it was obvious to others, 
and that the Plessy majority was more disingenuous than deferential. 
Be that as it may, in its form Plessy departs from Brown at this third stage: 
Plessy purports to turn on deference.  With respect to the question of whether 
the law is a reasonable attempt to promote the public good, or an invidious 
classification designed to annoy or oppress, Plessy says, “there must 
necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature.”62  Brown, in 
contrast, contains no language avowing deference to the southern legislatures 
or boards of education.63 
Where Brown remains deferential is at the remedial stage.  Brown II 
famously orders desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”64  Relative 
institutional competence provides some justification for this—how to 
dismantle segregation while minimizing disruption is certainly something state 
officials know better than federal courts.  But the Southern response featured 
more deliberation than speed, and some outright defiance.  Cooper v. Aaron 
announces that the Court will no longer defer on this remedial question. 
What the progress from Plessy to Brown and from Brown to Cooper 
shows, then, is the overwhelming of the institutional competence factor (which 
suggested deference) by evidence of bad faith (which suggests suspicion).  
This progress is justified, of course: At the time of Brown, it was clear that 
segregation was stigmatic,65 and at the time of Cooper it was clear that the 
Arkansas government was trying to frustrate desegregation. 
B. Parents Involved as a Successor to Brown 
The place of Parents Involved is harder to identify.  A first step is to try to 
read it as a successor to Brown and Cooper.  Assume, then, that the 
constitutional meaning is unchanged: It is that stigmatic or oppressive 
discrimination is forbidden.  The doctrinal rule, of course, has changed.  Rather 
than asking whether a particular act of racial discrimination is stigmatic (as 
Brown did), or applying strict scrutiny to discrimination against racial 
minorities (which would be a sensible reaction to the fact that such 
 
 61. Id. at 560. 
 62. Id. at 550 (majority opinion). 
 63. It might be argued that Brown contains some deference to the social scientists whose 
work it cites, but these studies are offered merely as “support” for conclusions drawn by district 
judges on the basis of direct evidence.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 65. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421, 425–26 (1960). 
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discrimination had proved almost invariably invidious), the Court has begun to 
use strict scrutiny for all racial discrimination.66 
That presents an immediate problem for the analysis: Why is the Court 
using this rule?  Certainly it makes sense to strictly scrutinize discrimination 
against racial minorities: History and process considerations both suggest that 
such discrimination is very likely to be oppressive, and there are no obvious 
legitimate reasons for it.  But discrimination that benefits minorities is quite 
different, and discrimination that neither systematically injures nor benefits 
any group is different, too.  The factors that support a demanding doctrinal test 
for discrimination against minorities do not support a similar test for 
discrimination in their favor. 
Why, then, might the Court be using strict scrutiny?  There is no way to be 
completely confident in the answer to this question, but I think the distinction 
between doctrine and meaning—or rather, its disappearance—is relevant.  If 
we lose sight of the distinction, as the Court tends to do after a certain period 
of time, and if we accept strict scrutiny for discrimination against racial 
minorities, we will conclude that the Constitution—not historical or process 
considerations, or any of the other factors that go into the creation of 
doctrine—demands that scrutiny.  If this demand comes directly from the 
Constitution, it is natural to read it as something like a rule that racial 
discrimination is constitutionally disfavored.  And if that is so, it is natural to 
ask why racial discrimination in favor of minorities should be any less 
problematic. 
This is, in fact, the path that the jurisprudence follows, beginning with 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,67 
and culminating in Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.68  The doctrinal test of strict scrutiny has been 
mistaken for part of the meaning of the Constitution, and logic then seems to 
demand that it operate equally with respect to all types of racial discrimination.  
The ultimate consequence is that the Court’s view of constitutional meaning 
has changed.  Rather than prohibiting invidious or stigmatizing discrimination 
(the view sometimes called anti-subordination), the Equal Protection Clause is 
now understood to prohibit, or at least strongly disfavor, racial discrimination 
(the view sometimes called anti-classification or color blindness). 
This changed view of meaning, I have suggested, gets some of its appeal 
from the conflation of doctrine and meaning, but I do not mean to argue that 
the conflation is either a necessary or a sufficient explanation.  Color blindness 
 
 66. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,  551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2751–52 (2007). 
 67. 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978) (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.”). 
 68. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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might have seemed more normatively attractive to some people, or it might 
have seemed expedient rhetoric to those who opposed affirmative action on 
nonconstitutional grounds.  (It does not seem to have arisen from historical 
research into the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.)  
Regardless, it is the color blindness view of meaning that we must consider in 
evaluating Parents Involved. 
Color blindness explains some otherwise extremely puzzling aspects of the 
Court’s current jurisprudence.  If racial classification is the evil to be averted, 
affirmative action is just as suspect as segregation, and it is no surprise that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits most attempts to grant benefits to racial 
minorities.  And if the evil is the classification, rather than its consequences, it 
makes sense that race-conscious measures falling short of overt classification 
are viewed more favorably,69 and classifications themselves are more 
pernicious if more explicit.70 
This principle explains the different outcomes in Gratz v. Bollinger71 and 
Grutter v. Bollinger:72 The law school program (which survived) used a less 
obvious system of racial preferences than the undergraduate program.  (It does, 
however, seem to introduce an asymmetry in the jurisprudence, in that 
established law holds that differential treatment on the basis of a characteristic 
other than race is just as prohibited if the intent and effect are to produce 
racially disproportionate results.73)  It also explains why the Equal Protection 
 
 69. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy suggested that school boards could 
pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through 
other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones 
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for 
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking 
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.  These mechanisms are race 
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each 
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand 
strict scrutiny to be found permissible. 
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70. Thus, for instance, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter finds the law school’s 
“holistic” evaluation system to be more narrowly tailored than a quota or the point system used 
by the undergraduate admissions.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–35, 337 (2003).  
“Narrowly tailored” here does not mean “admitting no more minorities than necessary,” for by 
that standard a quota system is perfectly tailored.  Instead, it must mean something like “giving 
race no more weight than is required to make a difference in the requisite number of cases.”  Of 
course, that sort of tailoring makes no difference to any individual applicant. 
 71. 539 U.S. 244, 268–75 (2003). 
 72. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003). 
 73. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–
66 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).  Thus, established law tells us that 
Justice Kennedy’s suggestions in Parents Involved should be analyzed as equivalent to an explicit 
racial classification, and if such schemes were used to exclude racial minorities they surely would 
not survive. 
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Clause will strike down race-based differential treatment that inflicts no harm 
on individuals beyond the differential treatment itself74 and why it might spare 
an apparently race-based classification when some other explanation can be 
given.75 
But whatever its merits and demerits (and more on the latter shortly), color 
blindness is not the view of meaning at work in Brown.  Parents Involved is 
inconsistent with Brown in terms of constitutional meaning.  One might say 
that it overrules Brown, except that the overruling was accomplished earlier, in 
cases like Adarand and Croson.  (Of course, from this perspective one would 
also say that Brown does not overrule Plessy.)  To get a good view of Parents 
Involved, we need to think about it in the context of these later cases. 
C. Parents Involved as a Successor to Grutter 
Parents Involved and Grutter share a color blindness view of constitutional 
meaning.  They differ largely in how deferential the Court is at the third stage 
of the model I have described, that of applying doctrine to facts.  Grutter is 
deferential to what the University of Michigan Law School says about the 
feasibility of alternatives and the significance of its interests.76  Parents 
Involved shows no similar deference to the school boards.77  In short, the 
relationship between Grutter and Parents Involved is, in a formal sense, quite 
like the relationship between Plessy and Brown, or between Brown and 
Cooper. 
But there is an important difference.  The Court’s abandonment of 
deference in Brown and Cooper was clearly justified.  The progress from 
Grutter to Parents Involved makes much less sense.  Once one adopts a color 
blindness reading of the Equal Protection Clause, as the Court has, 
governmental motive becomes irrelevant.  Strict scrutiny is not justified as a 
means to smoke out invidious discrimination, but rather to balance away the 
harms of racial classification.78  And if strict scrutiny is not a response to 
 
 74. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641, 650 (1993) (stating that plaintiffs 
challenging redistricting as race-based need not demonstrate vote dilution). 
 75. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (upholding apparently race-
based redistricting plan on the grounds that true classification is based on voting behavior).  
Cromartie is hard to reconcile with the cases asserting that race cannot be used as a proxy for 
other characteristics such as diversity or hardship—that is, that a racial stereotype is an 
impermissible justification.  For commentary on Cromartie, see, for example, John Hart Ely, 
Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only 
When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489 (2002). 
 76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29. 
 77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2751–61 (2007). 
 78. See Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 438.  The Court does, of course, say in some recent 
cases that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to determine whether an apparently benign 
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distrust of the state actor, deference at the third stage actually makes good 
sense. 
The assertiveness of Parents Involved—its embrace of judicial 
supremacy—is thus much less justifiable than the assertiveness of Brown and 
Cooper.  That is one strike against the decision.  The second strike, which 
applies to the earlier cases too, is that the color blindness principle has serious 
problems as an account of constitutional meaning. 
For one thing, its operation turns out to be inconsistent with the supposedly 
central principle that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not 
groups.79  If the state uses means short of an overt classification to achieve a 
particular racial result, all individuals are in exactly the same position as if the 
classification had been used: They have been granted or denied certain 
treatment because of their race.  If there is a difference, it is that the overt 
classification inflames society.80  That is, the interest being protected by 
banning the overt classification is a generalized, group interest, not the interest 
of any individual. 
Perhaps more significantly, the color blindness principle is hard to 
reconcile with history.  In the context of the debate over affirmative action, 
there have been arguments in the law reviews about the practice of the 
Reconstruction Congress, which seems to have included race-based 
preferences.81  Such laws, it is argued, demonstrate that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not subscribe to color blindness. 
But the argument can be made somewhat more strongly.  The evidence 
about post-Civil War affirmative action may be murky, but it is quite clear that 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not think that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited racially segregated schools or bans on interracial 
marriage.82  Color blindness is therefore obviously inconsistent with the 
original understanding.  (This is not to say that Brown is inconsistent with that 
understanding—I have argued above that it is entirely consistent with a 
 
classification is in fact invidious.  See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989).  But “invidious” here cannot have its traditional meaning of “intended to harm,” for 
there is no real dispute about the motive behind affirmative action plans—or at least, not a dispute 
over whether there is a hidden intent to harm either minorities or whites. 
 79. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2765 (summoning authority for this 
proposition). 
 80. See id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting divisiveness of racial classifications). 
 81. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 430–31. 
 82. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1955) (“If the fourteenth amendment were a statute, a court 
might very well hold . . . that it was foreclosed from applying it to segregation in public schools.  
The evidence of congressional purpose is as clear as such evidence is likely to be . . . .”).  Michael 
McConnell has made an heroic, but not in my view successful, attempt to argue the contrary.  
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995). 
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prohibition on invidious discrimination.)  And indeed, if we attempt to put 
ourselves in the shoes of the Reconstruction Congress, surveying the 
systematic brutality of the Ku Klux Klan and the oppression of the Black 
Codes, certain thoughts will naturally come to mind.  That all this would be 
acceptable if accomplished through race-neutral means is not one. 
CONCLUSION 
Parents Involved is indeed similar to Cooper v. Aaron in its thoroughgoing 
assertiveness, its embrace of judicial supremacy right down the line.  The 
Court has announced the color blindness principle, and with Parents Involved, 
it has further announced that it will neither defer nor brook defiance with 
respect to the implementation of that principle.  But color blindness is not the 
principle of Brown or Cooper, and Parents Involved is not the redemption of 
Brown but rather its strongest rejection. 
Why has the Court done this?  Supreme Court Justices are frequently 
accused of behaving willfully, of ruling based on their policy preferences 
rather than the law.83  Typically this assertion is unverifiable, which is why I 
have argued it is generally unhelpful.84  But Parents Involved is not a typical 
case.  Unusually, it shows us Justices both largely ignoring what they have 
previously asserted is determinative with respect to constitutional meaning85 
and voting in line with what they have previously announced as policy 
preferences. 
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, Chief Justice 
Roberts announced a distaste for racial classifications: “It is a sordid business, 
this divvying us up by race.”86  In Grutter, Justice Thomas argued that 
admissions preferences were bad policy, tempting “overmatched students” to 
“take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of 
competition.”87 
These are surprising statements to find in Supreme Court opinions, because 
they are so clearly policy views.  The Equal Protection Clause does not contain 
a prohibition of practices a Justice deems sordid.  Nor does it exist to keep 
minority students from aspiring beyond what a Justice thinks is their station.  If 
 
 83. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING 
AMERICA 12 (2005). 
 84. See ROOSEVELT, ACTIVISM, supra note 16, at 19. 
 85. The lack of attention to history by the originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas in the 
affirmative action cases is striking.  In Parents Involved, Justice Thomas makes a brief reference 
to Reconstruction-era affirmative action, but seems not to understand that the benefits distributed 
did not go only to freed slaves.  See 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2782 n.19 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 86. 548 U.S. 399, ____, 127 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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these views are the basis for the Justices’ votes, as one might fairly infer, then 
some Justices are indeed voting based on their views of wise policy rather than 
law.  We have a name for that.  But it is not judicial supremacy.  It is judicial 
activism.88 
 
 
 88. I have suggested that we would be better off not using the phrase “judicial activism.”  
See generally ROOSEVELT, ACTIVISM, supra note 16.  But in the rare case where Justices have 
both announced policy preferences as if they were legal arguments and declined to offer argument 
based on their generally preferred method of constitutional interpretation, it seems appropriate. 
